Improving HIV Surveillance Data for Public Health Action in Washington, DC: A Novel Multiorganizational Data-Sharing Method by Ocampo, Joanne et al.
Himmelfarb Health Sciences Library, The George Washington University
Health Sciences Research Commons
GW Biostatistics Center George Washington University Biostatistics Center
1-2016
Improving HIV Surveillance Data for Public Health
Action in Washington, DC: A Novel
Multiorganizational Data-Sharing Method
Joanne Ocampo
J. C. Smart
Adam Allston
Reshma Bhattacharjee
Sahithi Boggavarapu
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/biostatscenter_facpubs
Part of the Biostatistics Commons, and the Epidemiology Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the George Washington University Biostatistics Center at Health Sciences Research
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Biostatistics Center by an authorized administrator of Health Sciences Research Commons. For
more information, please contact hsrc@gwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ocampo, J.M., Smart, J.C., Allston, A., Bhattacharjee, R., Boggavarapu, S., Carter, S., ....Young, M.A. (2016). Improving HIV
Surveillance Data for Public Health Action in Washington, DC: A Novel Multiorganizational Data-Sharing Method. JMIR Public
Health Surveillance Report, 2(1), e3. doi: 10.2196/publichealth.5317
Authors
Joanne Ocampo, J. C. Smart, Adam Allston, Reshma Bhattacharjee, Sahithi Boggavarapu, Amanda D. Castel,
and +13 more
This journal article is available at Health Sciences Research Commons: http://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/biostatscenter_facpubs/140
Original Paper
Improving HIV Surveillance Data for Public Health Action in
Washington, DC: A Novel Multiorganizational Data-Sharing Method
Joanne Michelle F Ocampo1, MS; JC Smart2, PhD; Adam Allston3*, MS, MSW, PhD; Reshma Bhattacharjee4*, MBBS,
MS, MPH; Sahithi Boggavarapu5*, MPH; Sharon Carter5*, BBA; Amanda D Castel6*, MPH, MD; Jeff Collmann1*,
PhD; Colin Flynn4*, ScM; Auntré Hamp7*, LPC, MEd, MPH; Diana Jordan5*, RN, MS; Seble Kassaye8*, MS, MD;
Michael Kharfen7*, BA; Garret Lum7*, MPH; Raghu Pemmaraju9*, MS; Anne Rhodes5*, PhD; Jeff Stover5*, MPH;
Mary A Young8*, MD
1The Office of the Senior Vice President for Research, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States
2Department of Computer Science, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States
3The HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, STD and TB Administration, District of Columbia Department of Health, Washington, DC, United States
4Prevention and Health Promotion Administration, Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Baltimore, MD, United States
5Division of Disease Prevention, Virginia Department of Health, Richmond, VA, United States
6Milken Institute School of Public Health, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, United
States
7The HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, STD and TB Administration, Washington District of Columbia Department of Health, Washington, DC, United States
8The Washington DC Metropolitan Women’s Interagency HIV Study, Georgetown University Medical Center, Washington, DC, United States
9University Information Services, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, United States
*these authors contributed equally
Corresponding Author:
Joanne Michelle F Ocampo, MS
The Office of the Senior Vice President for Research
Georgetown University
2115 Wisconsin Avenue NW, suite 603
Washington, DC, 20007
United States
Phone: 1 2026874092
Fax: 1 2026879339
Email: jfo36@georgetown.edu
Abstract
Background: The National HIV/AIDS Strategy calls for active surveillance programs for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
to more accurately measure access to and retention in care across the HIV care continuum for persons living with HIV within
their jurisdictions and to identify persons who may need public health services. However, traditional public health surveillance
methods face substantial technological and privacy-related barriers to data sharing.
Objective: This study developed a novel data-sharing approach to improve the timeliness and quality of HIV surveillance data
in three jurisdictions where persons may often travel across the borders of the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia.
Methods: A deterministic algorithm of approximately 1000 lines was developed, including a person-matching system with
Enhanced HIV/AIDS Reporting System (eHARS) variables. Person matching was defined in categories (from strongest to
weakest): exact, very high, high, medium high, medium, medium low, low, and very low. The algorithm was verified using
conventional component testing methods, manual code inspection, and comprehensive output file examination. Results were
validated by jurisdictions using internal review processes.
Results: Of 161,343 uploaded eHARS records from District of Columbia (N=49,326), Maryland (N=66,200), and Virginia
(N=45,817), a total of 21,472 persons were matched across jurisdictions over various strengths in a matching process totaling 21
minutes and 58 seconds in the privacy device, leaving 139,871 uniquely identified with only one jurisdiction. No records matched
as medium low or low. Over 80% of the matches were identified as either exact or very high matches. Three separate validation
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2016 | vol. 2 | iss. 1 | e3 | p.1http://publichealth.jmir.org/2016/1/e3/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Ocampo et alJMIR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SURVEILLANCE
XSL•FO
RenderX
methods were conducted for this study, and they all found ≥90% accuracy between records matched by this novel method and
traditional matching methods.
Conclusions: This study illustrated a novel data-sharing approach that may facilitate timelier and better quality HIV surveillance
data for public health action by reducing the effort needed for traditional person-matching reviews without compromising matching
accuracy. Future analyses will examine the generalizability of these findings to other applications.
(JMIR Public Health Surveill 2016;2(1):e3)   doi:10.2196/publichealth.5317
KEYWORDS
HIV; surveillance; data sharing; public health; technology
Introduction
The US National HIV/AIDS Strategy has an increased focus
on retention and re-engagement in medical care and therefore
includes an action step to “strengthen the timely availability
and use of data” [1]. It calls upon human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) surveillance programs to better measure the
continuum of care for persons living with HIV (PLWH) in their
jurisdictions and also to identify individuals who are in need of
public health services aimed at improving linkage, retention,
and viral suppression for PLWH. These activities are often
described as data to care (D2C), as they utilize HIV surveillance
data for public health action [2]. To effectively perform these
D2C activities, HIV surveillance programs need more complete,
accurate, and timely measures of PLWH currently in their
jurisdictions, and information on whether and where they are
receiving care, and their health status (eg, antiretroviral therapy
use, CD4, and viral load measurements). However, several
challenges that affect HIV surveillance programs’D2C activities
still remain, including technical (eg, data format, missing data
caused by case migration across jurisdictions, out-of-jurisdiction
care utilization by HIV cases, and incomplete reporting by
out-of-jurisdiction laboratories used by in-jurisdiction HIV care
providers), motivational (opportunity cost), economic
(ownership/copyright), privacy, and ethical barriers [3,4].
Cross-jurisdictional notification of HIV cases, as directed by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, was designed
to ensure that all HIV cases are reported, but it does not function
well at tracking PLWH and their residence data over time or
reporting all instances of HIV care. The existing national
de-duplication process, the Routine Interstate Duplicate Review
(RIDR), is time- and resource-intensive, operates with a
significant delay between case report and duplicate resolution,
and most importantly, focuses mainly on residence at initial
diagnosis [5]. RIDR therefore does not adequately serve as an
effective tool to notify jurisdictions of updates to vital status or
address information, or to provide updated information on
migration or participation in out-of-jurisdiction care.
Effective utilization of big data can now facilitate timelier HIV
surveillance. Previous studies have demonstrated the potential
of effective data sharing technologies. In 2008, Pacheco et al
developed a hierarchical deterministic linkage technique and
fully automated matching algorithm for recovering the vital
status of people from different cohort data in Brazil [6]. They
did so to facilitate investigators’ efforts at finding people lost
to follow-up in mortality databases. Effective technological
advances can help public health officials develop more
up-to-date models of HIV diagnosis, linkage to, and retention
in care in the United States and elsewhere.
The US mid-Atlantic region experiences some of the highest
HIV prevalence rates among key population groups in the
country and is therefore critical to the national response to HIV
[7]. Health officials in this region have long hypothesized
movement of PLWH across the jurisdictions of the District of
Columbia (DC), the State of Maryland (MD), and the
Commonwealth of Virginia (VA), but traditional barriers to
data sharing have prevented comprehensive examinations of
this phenomena. In addition, there has been a longstanding
dialogue about HIV in the Washington, DC, metropolitan region
between Georgetown University and the DC Department of
Health on elements of clinical care, longitudinal research,
student internships, project planning, and many shared speaking
engagements, and also collaboration through the District of
Columbia Center for AIDS Research (DC-CFAR). Therefore,
in January 2013, health officials from DC, MD, and VA and
others met at Georgetown University to discuss regional sharing
of HIV/AIDS data in the Washington DC metropolitan region
(including areas in DC, MD, and VA). During the meeting, they
identified the pressing need for a novel and more timely
approach to sharing HIV surveillance data for D2C activities
in this region. They emphasized that any such approach must
account for the highly private and sensitive nature of public
health data. Following these aims, this study used a novel
data-sharing approach to examine cross-jurisdictional
person-matches of PLWH among the public health departments
of DC, MD, and VA.
Methods
Study Population
The study population included all persons with valid Enhanced
HIV/AIDS Reporting System (eHARS) records in DC, MD,
and VA databases from 1981 to 2015. eHARS is a Web-based
data system with an SQL-server back-end that is provided by
the CDC to all jurisdictions that collect HIV surveillance data.
Most jurisdictions maintain their HIV surveillance data in
eHARS, and all jurisdictions submit monthly data to the CDC
through eHARS. SAS versions 9.3 and 9.4 were used to
preprocess data from eHARS into a standardized format across
jurisdictions. These criteria excluded noncases, perinatal HIV
exposure records, records still under investigation, and not yet
designated as cases, and cases with errors, required fields
missing, or marked for deletion/purging.
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Institutional Review Board and Privacy
The study was reviewed by the Georgetown University
Institutional Review Board and was deemed exempt because
of the experimental design and computer technology that
specifically prevents persons from seeing person-identifiable
information, including the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)-protected information (see
Multimedia Appendix 1). For pre- and post-experiment
disaggregated data processing and analysis of HIPAA-protected
information, each public health department followed internal
procedures specific to their jurisdiction. A collaboratively
developed project-specific data security and confidentiality
procedures manual was applied in this study and was signed by
all jurisdictions and Georgetown University representatives.
Algorithm, Hardware, and System Configuration
Ada is a structured programming language defined by ISO/IEC
8652:2012. Originally funded by the United States Department
of Defense in 1973 to supersede hundreds of programming
languages then in use, Ada was specifically designed for high
integrity applications where code safety and reliability is
paramount. The Ada programming language was selected for
algorithm implementation here because of its unambiguous
semantics, extremely strong type and constraint checking,
exception protections, and overall reliability philosophy. A
deterministic treatment sustainment algorithm of approximately
1000 lines and a technologically robust computer (ie, the privacy
device) and physically secure environment were used in this
study (see Multimedia Appendix 1; [8]) following a privacy
technology approach previously described [9]. For identifying
false positives (ie, people who matched across jurisdictions but
should not have been matched) or locating false negatives (ie,
people who were not matched across jurisdictions but should
have been matched), manual case investigations of suspected
cases were conducted by each jurisdiction. No direct access
existed between jurisdictions’ eHARS servers and the privacy
device. Instead, jurisdictions posted information onto a secure
file transfer protocol site that then sent information (synthetic
test and real eHARS data) to the privacy device.
Algorithm Testing and Verification Using Synthetic
Data
Verification of the privacy device system was undertaken using
conventional component testing methods, manual code
inspection, and comprehensive output file examination. A
separate, but similar computer from the production company
was used for testing and verification of the program described
above. Facilitated by the participating jurisdictions and the CDC,
a large corpus of synthetic test data were made available to test
the algorithm. The majority of programming errors were
identified in the conversion process of external data files. Once
ingested and represented within Ada's strongly typed framework,
no errors that would result in program failure were identified.
Thorough testing of the algorithm uncovered an incorrect
assumption about the initial value of the variable at the
beginning of a programming loop under wildcard matching
conditions. This error was detected and corrected with the aid
of Ada 2012 preconditions and inline assertions. The matching
algorithm categories included (from strongest to weakest): exact,
very high, high, medium high, medium, medium low, low, and
very low (see Table 1).
Table 1. Overview of categories and definitions used in the study’s person-matching algorithm.
Variable definitionsaMatching categories
if m.last_name and m.first_name and m.dob and m.ssn and m.sex and m.race then m.score
:= exact;
Exact
elsif (m.last_name and m.first_name and m.dob and m.sex) or m.ssn then m.score := very_high;Very high
elsif m.last_name and m.first_name and m.dob and (m.sex or m.race) then m.score := high;High
elsif m.last_name and m.first_soundex and m.dob and m.sex then m.score := medium_high;Medium high
elsif m.last_name and m.dob and m.sex and m.race then m.score:= medium;Medium (1st definition)
elsif m.last_soundex and m.first_soundex and m.dob and (m.sex or m.race) then m.score :=
medium;
Medium (2nd definition)
elsif m.last_soundex and m.first_soundex and m.partial_dob and m.partial_ssn and (m.sex or
m.race) then m.score := medium_low;
Medium low
elsif m.last_soundex and (m.partial_dob and m.partial_ssn) and (m.sex or m.race) then m.score
:= low;
Low
elsif m.last_soundex and (m.partial_dob or m.partial_ssn) then m.score := very_low;Very low
aLast name=Last name of PLWH in eHARS person file; First name=First name of PLWH in eHARS person file; DOB=Date of birth of PLWH in
eHARS person file; SSN=Social Security Number of PLWH in eHARS person; Race=hierarchical race/ethnicity assignment for PLWH in eHARS
person-view; Soundex=Soundex is a phonetic, alphanumeric code created by converting a name into an index letter and a 3-digit code. The index letter
is the first letter of the name. The 3-digit code is calculated from the remaining letters of the name, based on rules found in the eHARS Technical
Guidance. There is a Soundex variable for first name and a Soundex for last Name.
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Output Validation
Three separate validation methods were used to verify the
findings of the privacy device to ensure validity across all
jurisdictions.
DC utilized Link Plus software to validate the matching
algorithm returns using the following parameters selected on
the basis of being frequently used for other internal matching
purposes: first name, last name, date of birth, and social security
number. The Link Plus–selected matching method for first name
and last name was “exact” and the matching method for date
of birth and social security number was “generic string.” Generic
string was selected for date of birth and social security number
to allow for matches of partial dates of birth and social security
number. A minimum selection score of zero was selected in
order to maximize the number of potential matches that would
be manually reviewed. Link Plus selected potential matches at
95% confidence interval based on the parameters specified, and
cases that were not within the confidence interval for the four
selected parameters were deemed nonmatches by the program
and were exported and not reviewed. For cases that were
reviewed, a hierarchy was used to determine where a case was
a match: (1) all cases with exact matches with all four
parameters were deemed matches; (2) all cases with matching
social security numbers (even in cases where there were
discrepancies in the other three parameters) were deemed
matches; (3) for all four parameters, a fuzzy match approach
was taken to determine if cases were matches, but typographical
errors were made in data entry or in the data received by the
health department; and (4) cases that were selected as
nonmatches during manual review, but that had the previously
described RIDR table or ID table (created when eHARS is
exported out as a dataset, where unique identifiers are stored)
information with matching STATENO (state number) were
considered a match.
For accepted matches, MD used matches where the STATENO
from other jurisdictions matched the previously collected
STATENO from that jurisdiction already in the MD eHARS
database, both from RIDR and ID tables. In cases where there
was a conflict between the RIDR and the ID tables, manual
review of the matching variables (name, DOB, SSN, race, sex)
was conducted before the match was accepted or rejected. Any
matches that had nonmatching STATENOs were checked to
see if there was an apparent error in the MD version of the
STATENOs. If there was, manual review of the matching
variables was done to determine an acceptable match using the
STATENO provided by the other jurisdiction as the correct
STATENO (meaning the STATENO that MD had in their
eHARS database was an error). For matches with missing
STATENO in the MD database, manual review of the matching
variables was done to establish if they were acceptable matches
or not. Manual review was done for all exact and very high
matching categories and on a 5% sample (no less than 10) from
each of high, medium high, medium, and very low categories.
For the last validation method, VA split the DC/MD-VA
matched dataset into VA, MD, and DC datasets by STATENO
and matched with their respective states’ patient identifying
data. The match was based on VA and the respective state’s
STATENO. The datasets were then run through the Link King
software that identified potential matches between the DC/MD
and VA data. Potential matches were identified based on first
name, last name, date of birth, race, and social security number.
Potential matches were assigned a certainty level from 1 to 4
(strongest to weakest). Observations with no potential matches
identified were left unmatched for manual review. The Link
King results were matched again by STATENOs to the privacy
device match level. A simple random sample from each privacy
device match level was taken. A 25% sample was taken from
the exact and very high match levels, a 30% sample from the
high match level, a 40% sample from the medium high match
level, and a 50% sample from the medium and very low match
levels. The Link King software did identify a few DC/MD cases
that were duplicates within the same DC/MD datasets. While
noted, only one of the cases was included in the analysis dataset.
There were several cases in the DC and MD datasets that were
matched to more than one STATENO; however, only the
matches that were accounted for by Link King and were the
highest match level were incorporated in the analyses. The
review indicated that over 90% of matches in the exact, very
high, and high categories were affirmed by Link King to be
strong matches.
Results
This study found that from 1981 to 2015, a total of 21,472
persons were matched in eHARS databases across DC, MD,
and VA over various strengths in a matching process totaling
21 minutes and 58 seconds in the privacy device, leaving
139,871 uniquely identified with only one jurisdiction (see Table
2). More than 80% were high-level matches, including 5933
exact matches, and 11,590 very high matches. Overall, more
than 90% of matched records across all three jurisdictions were
considered accurate matches after the three separate validation
methods were applied in each jurisdiction (see Tables 3-5).
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Table 2. Overview of person matches in eHARS databases across DC, MD, and VA from 1981 to 2015.
TotalVery lowMediumMedium highHighVery highExactPerson matches across jurisdic-
tions
11,3684826452685359074013DC-MDa
4569865377117112343856MD-VAb
55355294381491533401064VA-DCc
21,472187614605347911,5905933Total
aDC-reported MD matches were equal to MD-reported DC matches.
bMD-reported VA matches were equal to VA-reported MD matches.
cVA-reported DC matches were equal to DC-reported VA matches.
Table 3. DC validation results.
TotalMatchNonmatch
%N%N%N
District of Columbia/Maryland
100.04009100.040090.00Exact
100.0582495.555604.5264Very High
100.052100.0520.00High
100.026798.92641.13Medium High
100.063572.045728.0178Medium
100.047130.214269.9329Very Low
100.011,25893.1104846.9774Total
District of Columbia/Virginia
100.01067100.010670.00Exact
100.0331999.032861.033Very High
100.013100.0130.00High
100.014996.61443.45Medium High
100.043579.134420.991Medium
100.050720.910679.1401Very Low
100.0549090.449609.7530Total
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Table 4. MD validation resultsd.
TotalMatchNonmatch
%N%N%N
Maryland/District of Columbia
100.04030100.040300.00Exact
100.0587099.258460.424Very High
100.052100.0520.00High
100.0272100.02720.00Medium High
100.063873.9N/A67.5431Medium
100.046728.6N/A94.4441Very Low
100.011,32998.6Total
Maryland/Virginia
100.0855100.08550.00Exact
100.0234499.723360.410Very High
100.011100.0110.00High
100.0118100.01180.00Medium High
100.037790.3N/A77.5292Medium
100.085815.3N/A96.3827Very Low
100.0456397.7Total
dSince a 5% random sample was used to manually review Medium & Very Low categories, exact numbers (N) of matches could not be shown in this
table.
Table 5. VA validation results.
TotalMatchNonmatch
%N%N%N
Virginia/Maryland
100.0214100.02140.00Exact
100.058396.45623.621Very High
100.04100.040.00High
100.04793.6446.43Medium High
100.018446.78653.398Medium
100.04082.0898.0400Very Low
100.0144063.891836.3522Total
Virginia/District of Columbia
100.0264100.02640.00Exact
100.081698.38021.714Very High
100.04100.040.00High
100.05893.1546.94Medium High
100.020766.713833.369Medium
100.022712.32887.7199Very Low
100.0157681.9129018.1286Total
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Discussion
Application to HIV Surveillance Data and Public
Health Action
Public health resources are limited and enhancements in
surveillance data can assist with improved utilization of such
resources. More specifically, improvements in the accuracy and
timeliness of surveillance data is critical for D2C activities
because it reduces the time and effort expended by staff in
tracking down persons moving across jurisdictions who do not
require assistance re-engaging in care. Using the novel
data-sharing approach developed in this study, DC, MD, and
VA were able to identify the number of person matches of
people with known HIV status from 1981 to 2015 across their
eHARS databases in a relatively short amount of time. This
allowed more detailed follow-up data exchanges among the
public health jurisdictions that will facilitate future outreach
efforts to people living with HIV, and it provided a direct
opportunity to clean up outdated HIV surveillance records,
including updating vital status and current address.
As expected, this study saw that higher matching strength
categories (eg, exact, very high, and medium high) observed
higher rates of accuracy (>90%) with matches across
jurisdictions, while lower matching strength categories (eg, low
and very low) saw lower rates (15-30%) of accuracy with
matches across jurisdictions (see Tables 3-5). It is worthy to
note that lower matching categories still provided important
data on potential matches for jurisdictions. Additionally, after
manual review of the lower strength matches, this study found
that lower strength matches remain valid for finding person
matches. Higher-level matches may therefore be more readily
accepted, while lower-level matches should still require manual
verification. These higher matching categories are good for
keeping updated surveillance records or for doing matching
across different public health jurisdictions. The higher level
matching strength categories (ie, exact, very high, and high)
had very high levels of match validation with almost no false
matches. This would support accepting an automated matching
process that could be used either for more timely surveillance
activities, allowing jurisdictions to identify individuals for
interventions or to produce reliable statistical analyses of care
patterns across jurisdictions without direct sharing of
confidential identifying data and protected health information.
Additionally, lower matching categories are useful for improving
matches. The lower matching strength categories (ie, low, very
low) had low levels of match validation (15-30%), which would
not be appropriate for routine matching and specifically not
appropriate for automated real-time matching. However, they
did produce initially large numbers of valid matches and could
be utilized by jurisdictions to improve the completeness of their
datasets, which would then improve later automated matches.
The importance of this effort for improving the effectiveness
of surveillance data can already be seen in recent pilot efforts
by jurisdictions to utilize surveillance data for public health
action. For example, in VA, a pilot study of intervening with
persons considered lost to care (n=43) found that 39% of these
persons were actually in care, 21% were living out of state, and
7% were deceased. It appears that the majority of the in-care
cases were categorized as lost to care due to incomplete lab
reporting, although ongoing investigation continues of each
case. These results translated into two-thirds of persons not
requiring follow-up by VA D2C personnel, but because this
information was not known to the surveillance team, time and
effort was expended to locate and re-engage these persons. The
matching method applied here can dramatically improve the
timeliness and efficiency of public health action in the DC
metropolitan region.
Comparison to Traditional Surveillance Methods and
Timeliness of Public Health Action
RIDR is an activity that relies on CDC to run its algorithm to
identify potential matches across jurisdictions using the Soundex
and other variables. Semi-annually, the CDC produces a list of
potential matches for each jurisdiction to review with the other
identified jurisdictions to ascertain who diagnosed the case.
Then each jurisdiction exchanges information over the phone,
updates the eHARS records, and gives the record a designation
of either “same as” or “different than.” In contrast, our method
identified persons already included in prior RIDR lists and also
added to such lists new matches that were not previously
included at a much faster rate than RIDR. Additionally, this
method allowed for inclusion of recently updated data, unlike
RIDR, which may include outdated information on vital status
and residence.
Addressing Barriers to Public Health Data Sharing
This novel data-sharing method also provided means for
improved surveillance data and public health action, while it
simultaneously addressed the six major barriers to public health
data sharing as previously outlined by van Panhuis et al [3]:
1. Technical: According to van Panhuis et al, incompatible
electronic record systems in multiple languages tend to
prevent sharing public health data. This project employed
the system that all public health jurisdictions use to report
HIV information to CDC known as eHARS. The mode of
connecting each local eHARS to the privacy device fell
within the technical competence of each jurisdiction in
consultation with the Georgetown University Information
Services staff.
2. Motivational: The literature review found that different
missions and local orientation undermined motivation for
sharing information among public health jurisdictions. From
the perspective of the public health jurisdictions in this
project, the matching algorithm enabled finding persons
otherwise lost to care, enhanced the value of available data,
and established jurisdictions as pioneers—all strong
motivating factors in their participation.
3. Economic: The literature review identified cost of partnering
as a barrier to data sharing. Although staff from the
jurisdictions invested many more hours in this project than
the grant covered, they realized that, if successful, the
matching algorithm could reduce time and labor to find
persons in other jurisdictions from months to minutes,
impractical to feasible, and unaffordable to affordable.
4. Political: According to van Panhuis et al, barriers of
mistrust often prevent data sharing among public health
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agencies. Participating in this project encouraged the
jurisdictions to exchange formal data use agreements.
Beyond these formal agreements, however, the project work
built a solid collaboration through a continuous series of
project meetings, milestones, and major achievements over
2 years, including conferences hosted by Georgetown
University in Washington, DC, on regional sharing of
infectious disease data (January 2013) and the privacy
device (November 2014), and presentations at the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) “Harnessing Big Data to Halt
HIV” conference (July 2015) and the National HIV
Prevention Conference in Atlanta, Georgia (December
2015).
5. Legal: The literature review notes that, in many cases,
incompatible laws, rules, and policies block data sharing.
The jurisdictions in this project always had the legal right
to share data for cases that involved other jurisdictions
through separate data-sharing agreements. Nonetheless, the
precise design of the technology enabled the algorithm to
compare cases across jurisdictions without exposing data
that should not be shared (ie, cases that did not involve
other jurisdictions) either to other jurisdictions or to the
third party facilitating the matching (Georgetown
University).
6. Ethical: From a purely ethical perspective, we see our
responsibilities with respect to this novel architecture and
data flow in terms of data stewardship—the total process
of investigating and safeguarding the ethical and privacy
implications of recombining, reusing, repurposing, and
reanalyzing multiple types of data from multiple sources
with the explicit purpose of identifying and providing care
to PLWH, especially those who, for various reasons, have
dropped out of care [10]. However, the authors of the
literature review focus on fairness of organizational work
distribution in partnering for data sharing. Partnerships in
data sharing often fail because some partners do more work
than others and feel abused. From the perspective of the
literature review, therefore, this project functioned as a true
collaboration where the public health jurisdictions served
as co-investigators, co-designers, data providers, and project
beneficiaries. The actual data exchange fell within their
purview and authority as public health jurisdictions with
the right and responsibility to manage information about
persons with HIV in their jurisdictions. Georgetown
University did not view protected health information within
the course of this study.
Limitations and Future Directions of Study
While this method of matching people across eHARS databases
in different jurisdictions saved time in comparison with more
traditional methods, the manual validation process of this study
was relatively time consuming. Therefore, future efforts should
consider how to more effectively streamline this manual
validation process. Also, although it was clear to the authors
that the privacy device computed person matches across eHARS
databases in a relatively short amount of time, while outside
the scope of this initial study, future studies could perform a
comprehensive assessment of the economic impact of
implementing this technology in comparison with more
traditional methods. Additionally, although the privacy platform
provided high privacy assurance, one should note that with
fewer resource constraints, more computational and
mathematical power could be added to develop an even higher
level of privacy assurance. Furthermore, no records were
matched as medium low or low. This might indicate that
parameters that defined such matching categories were
insufficient for these purposes and should be revised for future
projects. Moreover, it is important to underline that since this
study considered all valid eHARS case records, its outcome is
reflective of both historical and current patient migration in this
metropolitan region from 1981 to 2015. This may or may not
be aligned with current patient migration rates; therefore, future
efforts should further examine the levels of migration over the
last 3-5 years in the cross-jurisdictional DC metropolitan region.
Although this study used RIDR information as part of the
validation processes to check if the privacy device matches were
indeed reported in pre-existing RIDR lists, future study
directions could include a comprehensive evaluation to check
if the opposite is also true—that all known RIDR matches can
be detected using the privacy device. Similarly, while beyond
the scope of this methods-focused study, future research efforts
could also assess the overall impact of this data-sharing
technology on public health reporting to CDC.
The person matching in this study was performed on all valid
cases, ignoring any previously known information on migration
and data sharing between jurisdictions. Future iterations should
incorporate existing knowledge on interjurisdictional cases and
also explore characteristics of individuals who migrate across
state borders for HIV care to find patterns that can be helpful
in identifying intervention points along the HIV care continuum.
Exploring longitudinal cohort data from this geographic region
may help supplement essential data on why people experience
patient in- and out-migration in this region. In this regard, it
may be useful to examine data from observational cohorts like
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Women’s Interagency
HIV Study—an ongoing prospective cohort study of HIV
infection in women across Washington DC, Montgomery
County, Maryland, and Northern Virginia [11]. It is also worthy
to note that this study considered those who were already
confirmed as HIV infected (as indicated by eHARS case record)
and was not designed to address individuals who are unaware
of their HIV status (ie, no eHARS record) or address those who
were not matched.
This method can be used to help public health officials and their
partners develop HIV care continuum models that better
contextualize HIV in the United States for resource allocation
purposes [12,13]. It can, for example, be used in future efforts
comparing more traditional surveillance methods (eg, eHARS)
with newer social media techniques (eg, Twitter, Google Flu
Trends, HealthTweets) or in exploring patient in- and
out-migration, which remains a large knowledge gap in HIV
epidemiology [14-16]. Moreover, since large metropolitan
regions experience high levels of person movements, such areas
may provide fruitful grounds for further examination of mobility
in HIV care using this novel approach [17]. Lastly, this
technology is applicable to public health data sharing outside
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of HIV disease surveillance, and the authors have already began
to explore applications to other infectious disease data.
Conclusion
Using a novel technology and interdisciplinary and
public-private partnership, this study effectively addressed how
to improve HIV surveillance data for public health action. This
approach can provide a more effective bridge between data and
care in public health and may be applied to other purposes.
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